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Based on  neo-regionalist literature, this paper put on the foreground the importance of 
public utilities in the “governance” processes. New economic and cultural trends need 
the abandon of a hierarchical model of government in favour of the governance model, 
based on organizational structures of partnership and/or of open market. A first step in 
governance process is the decentralization, or “decentralizing governance”, that is to 
restructure and to reorganize local authority with the creation of a system of co-
responsibility among institutions at the central, regional and local levels according to 
the principle of “subsidiarity”, and public, private or civil stakeholders. A typical public 
domain service, the public utilities management, become a crucial issue in order to 
identity and measure “governance” quality in different local contexts. The paper 
compares three different typologies in the public utilities market and their effects on the 
“governance” process. A first typology is based on tenders enhancing the concurrence 
among local and foreign actors for gaining the assets of the local services; a second one 
is based on the “project financing strategy”, involving a cooperation mechanism 
between public and private sector: this model is diffused all over the world; a third one 
is focused on the sharing of the whole local services branch among a number of 
contractors, each one assuring the best of efficiency in its field. 
Finally, the paper aims identifying “actors” and “items” of the governance  model  
involved in public utilities management and giving also indications and suggestions for 
the implementation of local strategies and policies in order to enhance cooperative 








The recent global trends and the erosion of the economic sovereignty of the State-nation 
(Ohmae,1996) have resulted in a rethinking of the national Governments’ role and 
economic development policies. The hierarchical model of the State, based on the 
principle of authority, has been defeated by the multiplication of players and layers of 
negotiation – international, national, and local – which require a different model of 
government, referred to as  governance, based on the principle of subsidiarity. These 
levels of negotiation occur within organizational structures of interaction and 
partnership that are more and more characterizing local societies (Perulli, 2000). 
However, several States have started processes of decentralisation of the public sector, 
creating a plurality of government levels, a good process of governance involves many 
geographic authorities, societal stakeholders and social sectors. Geographic entities 
include international, national, sub-national, and local authorities. Social stakeholders 
include the Government, the private sector, and the civil society. Due to the complexity 
of today’s societies and market globalisation, this process  could benefit from the 
development of trans-national, regional, and local networks.  
While the governance issues have become more and more important, as demonstrated 
by the many investigations and international conferences that focus on them, and also 
by the interest of the European Union which dedicated a White Book to governance, 
little has been done in order to evaluate at local level both the effects of networking on 
governance and the role of intermediate institutions.  
Therefore, a general goal could to investigate how to assess the effectiveness of 
governance strategies and, in order to obtain an adequate proxy of these processes, to 
analyse a phenomenon closely linked to the wider participation of economic, social and 
political agents in the processing and implementation of decentralised decision-making, 
i.e. the reform of the system of public utilities.  
This paper aims to assess the evolution of the public utilities market, filtered through the 
study of the behaviours of the different stakeholders and the connections of these latter 
in terms of interdependency and cooperation. The theoretical approach adopts neo-
regionalist concepts, focusing on the importance of the empowerment of the regional 
institutions for local development as well as on the growth of models of social 
interaction at a regional level. 
  2A public strategy of decentralisation and entrepreneurial management of local 
institutions is considered as at the heart of administrative governance . In this 
framework, the advanced training of public agents is crucial as much as the growing 
responsibility of local institutions, in terms of efficiency and achievement of results. 
Today more and more importance is attached to regional institutions ( Cappellin& 
Batey, 1993) as they are intended to create and support regular and continuity models of 
social interaction at a regional level ( Saxenian, 1994). 
 
1. 1  Governance, decentralisation and intermediate institutions  
 
Considering as a premise that governance is the exercise of political, economic and 
administrative authority to manage a society's affairs – which include those 
mechanisms, processes and institutions through which collective decisions are made and 
implemented, and through which citizens, groups and communities, that pursue their 
visions, coordinate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and 
mediate their differences – we refer to a multilevel governance that operates through 
territorial and functional networks, cross-cutting policy networks, a number of   
technical bodies, distributive coalitions and organised economic groups. In this idea of 
governance , the ability to solve conflicts becomes of crucial importance. Means such as 
participation, partnership, empowering and enabling, and community focus could be 
seen as fostering transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, accountability 
and equity. 
In order to change from a pyramidal governmental system to a multilevel governance, a 
first step is decentralization, or “decentralizing governance”. It refers to the 
restructuring or reorganization of the authority to  create a system of co-responsibility 
across the institutions of governance at a central, regional and local level according to 
the principle of subsidiarity, thus improving the overall quality and effectiveness of the 
governance system, and  increasing the authority and competence at the sub-national 
levels
1. 
During the past decades, Governments have attempted to implement a variety of 
administrative decentralization policies. These have ranged from wider scope ones, 
which were meant to transfer development planning and management responsibilities to 
the local units of government, to those with a narrower scope which were intended  to 
decentralise or reallocate administrative the tasks to the units of central government. On 
  3an unprecedented scale, central governments are allocating more substantial portions of 
their national budgets, more administrative authority, more economic responsibilities 
and more political autonomy to local authorities. However, some difficulties still remain 
in the decentralization process which are due to cultural and political elements, as those 
emerging from the way in which the public perceives a host issues including the issue of 
authority, of the role of the Government, of the role of citizens, of the problem of 
conflicts, of consensus building, of power and of the role of elites. But, far from being 
exhaustive the list of the issues in question may go on as follows: 
⇒  The complexity of different administrative levels;   
⇒  A clear-cut distinction between the objectives of the central Government and the 
needs of local authorities; 
⇒  The limits of adaptation to the networking model on the part of the stakeholders 
of the civil society and of private sector; 
⇒  Budget limitations;  
⇒  Human resources qualification. 
Therefore, governance needs capacities, both at a central and at a local levels to 
coordinate goals, policies and strategies.  
At the same time, it is recognized that an improved governance requires not only 
strengthened central and local governments but also the involvement of other 
stakeholders from the civil society and the private sector in partnerships with 
governments at all levels. Capacity building in all of the three spheres of governance – 
State, society, and private sector – becomes so critical. In this context a really efficient 
role could be played by intermediate institutions that may become key partners of 
national and sub-national governments in their transition towards decentralization-based 
forms of local governance.  
It is also very important to emphasise the need for a common course leading to 
consensus building, that is expected to rely on the recognition of a starting point and of 
the  preconditions for building a consensus (the perceptions, aims, actions and resources 
of the stakeholders involved in the development project). This is the only possible way 
to describe the dynamics of convergence and divergence of the different components of 
the process in terms of their  common goals. The policy networks fall within this very 
useful context. By policy networks we mean the governance model of contemporary 
societies and economic systems, which is characterised by the setting up of more or less 
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policy programs (Kickert et all, 1997 b). Policy networks are in fact characterised by: 
•  The interdependence among their stakeholders and the substantial absence or only 
partial importance of hierarchical relations (more precisely, within the network the 
stakeholders cannot pursue their own objectives but by using others’ resources too); 
•  The high variety and likely large number of stakeholders, each bringing their own 
set of goals, values, behavioural models and resources; 
•  The stability (high or low) within time of relations among such stakeholders 
(shared perceptions, participation models and interaction rules, when repeated over 
time, develop and are formalised into institutions); 
•  A down-sized, albeit highly specific, role of the public stakeholders, a role that 
cannot be replaced by that of other stakeholders, although bound, at the same time, by 
particular constraints such as legality and a reduced possibility of choice and selection 
of their own interlocutors; 
•  The presence of stakeholders, say entrepreneurial associations, universities, etc., 
which play a role in pursuing particular objectives, but have neither experience nor 
specific skills in the management of collective actions and therefore must gain and 
progressively develop their relational/political know-how; 
•  The centrality  of the interactive processes for the integration of the stakeholders’ 
objectives, perceptions, and resources; 
•  The centrality of the objective of improving the conditions in which the 
interactions amongst stakeholders occur,  (social capital). 
With reference to the management of public utilities, which is a  central issue in the 
most recent studies of Public Economics, the economic literature identifies several 
benefits deriving from decentralisation  such as:  
•  Bigger opportunities to adapt services to consumers’ needs;  
•  More possibilities to involve citizens in a more democratic approach; 
•  More responsibilities to local authorities; 
•  Higher efficiency and effectiveness; 
•  A better control on public expenditure. 
In the field of public utilities, by operating  through the so-called territorial and 
functional  policy networks, which allow to establish social, economic and political 
relations for pursuing common goals, the benefits resulting from decentralisation are 
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changes in policy networks that cause the fragmentation of the policy communities in a 
number of issue networks, each one focused on a different aspect of the privatisation 
policy. Still this confirms that, in such a complex context governance has no longer only 
to do with the market efficiency, whose failures it is expected to correct, but also with 
the regulation of the social and political life.  
This is why we talk of policy networks, of the central role played by the integration of 
these elements and of the importance of attaining an improvement in the conditions in 
which the interactions amongst stakeholders occur (social capital). 
At a first approximation, and in very simple terms, the policy communities of the 
various sectors could be thought of as made up by civil service officers, business 
workers, potential buyers of businesses and competitors, in addition to the same 
government officials and public administrators (regulators) in charge of governing 
social and political life. The issue networks instead are made up of all “citizens” in their 
various societal and professional roles, and often also by “regulators” belonging to 
sectorial or inter-sectorial  Authorities (Pedersini, 1999). These institutions, through 
which this variety of subjects become operational, are worthwhile considering as they 
seem to be placed in a meso-dimension (intermediate dimension) that occurs between 
two top-level entities: the State and the community, equally involved in the operational 
context of the public utilities.  
These meso-dimensional bodies are referred to as intermediate institutions with the 
precise purpose of highlighting their role of connection and mediation between the State 
and the community. In these intermediate institutions, personal and particularistic 
relations co-exist, generating a mixture of flexible regulations that enable the same 
institutions to act as powerful mechanisms to stabilise and mitigate the tensions likely to 
occur between the micro and the macro level (Arrighetti & Serravalli, 1999). 
The presence of these intermediate institutions makes it possible, on the one hand, to 
control, rationalise and plan the reproduction processes of economic, social and political 
relations on a wide scale (national and international), and from the other, to guarantee 
margins of efficiency to the operational contexts within which stakeholders act.  
The network of interconnectivity created in a perspective of governance through these 
intermediate institutions becomes particularly obvious and complex within the 
operational system of public utilities.  
  6Now, considering these concepts as key elements, it seems appropriate, at this point of 
our analysis, to focus on the evolution of the various forms of management of public 
utility services and highlight, in terms of governance, their main strengths and 
weaknesses. 
 
2.1 Forms o management of  public services, between regulating and privatising
2. 
 
Until a few decades ago, within the theoretic debate on the management of public 
utilities, it seemed that a fundamental conceptual distinction had  been accepted 
between the public authority’s decision to intervene in providing a service of public 
utility to correct a market failure and the decision by the same authority to directly take 
on the task of supplying such service through public owned facilities. The rationale of  
such considerations was supported by two key elements: 
•  The social importance of services in question and, therefore, their universal 
access and  security supply, which made it mandatory to guarantee them even when 
production costs exceeded profits; 
•  The poor self-dependence of the market that in the presence of market failures 
(natural monopolies, externalities) called for a corrective action on the part of the 
State which could be both in the form of issuing laws for private businesses (as in the 
case of the US) or in the form of a the direct management of the service by the State, 
which could even become the owner of the service itself (as in the case of Europe) 
(Bognetti, 1999). 
At the end of the 90’s, however, the situation seemed totally unsatisfying. In fact, the 
production  organisation of public utility services was characterised by: 
1.  A total lack of competition, both in the market and for the market, with a 
resulting productive inefficiency due to the inability of containing costs; 
2.  An inefficient price structure in terms of allocation; 
3.  High prices and poor quality for users/consumers. 
Therefore the confidence in the State’s entrepreneurial capabilities seemed to have 
been eroded. The mainly criticized elements were the public company’s level of 
efficiency, the fact that the Government’s action wasn’t necessarily in the public 
interest and the limits imposed by the traditional systems of regulations to the 
development of competitive mechanisms, to the detriment of efficient results.  
  7This was why the awareness of the nature of  public assets of some services, together 
with the unavoidable necessity to supply them effectively and efficiently, determined 
the emergence of new processes including the privatisation and the liberalization of 
the public utilities
3. 
The initial realisation and belief that the Public Subject should totally abandon its 
production role to take on, instead, a strong role in the governance and regulation of 
services, gave rise to variegated set of  forms of action. The need to “deregulate” 
wide areas of management to give way to the forces that spontaneously act upon the 
market has become more and more felt.   
On the basis of this principle, once freed of its managerial and organisational 
production role, the public sector can, in fact, devote itself to pursuing collective 
interests with a higher level of motivation, adopting suited instruments of regulation, 
according to the classic theory of economic regulation (Boitani & Petretto, 2000). On 
such grounds, the choice of the most appropriate instruments to start privatisation 
processes seems rather challenging. In fact, the set of the  issues resulting from 
supplying public services and from formulating public policies gives place to 
sensitive processes of local governance as well as to a set of decisions with a direct 
effect on the well-being and life quality of the community. In more general terms, 
each activity aiming to organise the market and to establish a better allocation of 
resources for the community’s benefit runs the inevitable risk of not being able to 
fulfil the needs of all users since competition, which is peculiar to the market of 
public services, privileges some users while damaging others, thus creating harm to 
the socio-economic balance of one area.  
In a market economy the differences between different public services increase when 
the institutions tend to guarantee minimum levels ,but the market is not strong 
enough to cope by itself, with only partial support from the public system. 
Pursuing general interests implies therefore the obligation to guarantee a service 
accessible by anyone, in terms of both  quality and prices, regardless of the different 
economic situations. 
Hence the notion of “competition” could play a role in that it may account for an 
alternative to the intervention of the only public subject, relying on the fact that 
competitiveness between companies stimulates the production of better services. At 
this point it would be expedient, however, to emphasise the double aspect of 
competition.  
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prevails under which all operators should undertake to be competitive with each other 
and under which special rights destined to a restricted number of operators or to one 
only company apply only exceptionally. In this case, the access to the market is 
completely free. The positive outcome is represented by the impossibility for single 
operators to register extra-profits, ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. 
By contrast, the most spread competition system for  the market resorts to the 
principle of competitive bidding in a view to selecting managing agents with specific 
requirements and characteristics, both on a technical and economic level. This seems 
therefore even more interesting from an application viewpoint, since it identifies 
itself with the possibility to “offer as a price” the entire market, while companies 
compete for the right to supply a service in temporary monopoly conditions. 
In the absence of appropriate requirements on the part of the operators, even within a 
system of full competition for the market, the risk remains that contracts cannot be 
given out. This determines, as a consequence, an intermediate situation where local 
authorities can intervene i) by designating one or more operators on which they 
impose strict constraints and/or ii) by applying a shared clearing system and/or iii) by 
relying on public funds. 
We must therefore avoid eager optimism in evaluating the results obtainable from the 
application of tender mechanisms, since we cannot under-evaluate the difficulty of 
defining a univocal model to apply to all services or even to all the production phases 
of a specific service, on the consideration that the entrepreneurial nature does not 
properly apply to any area of activity, but it should rather be a characteristic of the 
service itself, and of the subjects providing it. For instance, the production conditions 
characterising water supply are very different from those of gas or electricity 
services. The characteristics of the various phases of production of the former (water 
resources) are only hardly discernible in terms of defining market policies, whereas 
in the case of the latter the clear-cut separation of the productive process and the 
features of the individual phases is such that larger margins are left to resort to the 
market of public utilities. 
The approach that seems to be more appropriate is that of evaluating the conditions 
of applicability of one or the other criterion of intervention case by case, according to 
the specific configurations of the service and of the market. 
  9Hence, there are no services, activities or functions destined, by their nature, to be 
entrepreneurial or forcedly predisposed  to certain mechanisms. It is rather the 
stakeholders’ choices, both institutional and economic, that favour the involvement 
of entrepreneurial subjects in specific areas of activity. 
All these variants focus draw our attention on an in-depth analysis of the subjects 
involved in the post-privatisation “market construction”, with a special focus on the 
multiple factors involved, including incentive mechanisms, the control of the 
management activity, the levels of interest, and the resources of institutional kind.  
 
2.3 Theoretical models of public utilities regulation 
 
In order to identify and measure the quality of the governance of public utilities it 
seems appropriate to analyse three different types of regulations: the first is based on 
the model of participation of the companies in the competitive tenders; the second 
relates to the project financing strategy; the third focuses on multi-services 
companies. 
In Italy one of the most spread modality of operation of the Local Public Utilities 
(“SPL”, Servizi Locali Publici) at an industrial level consists in commissioning work 
through tenders, which allows companies to receive the collectable  proceeds.  
When an industrial type utility utilises a network or trades some of its services for its 
own operation, there is no public call for tenders because in this case it appears more 
appropriate to encourage competition in the market among the managing agents 
involved
4. 
The increase in the size of these public utilities has been prioritised to the detriment 
of competitiveness, which has, no doubt, led the companies to become stronger, 
protected as they have been by a prolonged monopoly, yet without favouring the 
growth and consolidation of their entrepreneurial characteristics to guarantee their 
place on the international market
5.   
There is therefore a need to overcome management ”in economy” which, in some 
ways, allows the local authority to keep SMEs under their control. Quite the contrary, 
it’s the responsibility of the Regional Boards, within their own coordination and 
industrial planning functions, to establish a set of tax holidays and financial 
incentives to favour the aggregation of  small businesses. 
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of favouring the privatisation process, in particular in those contexts where the small 
and medium size of the enterprises slows down the growth of a competitive system. 
This also confirms the need to separate the guidance and planning role from the 
management one which, governed by an agreement, takes place giving out a contract  
to a managing agent whose relation with the local authority is ruled by a service 
agreement.  
This separation of roles allows the local authority to pursue collective interests 
through its role of  guidance, planning, vigilance and control, while companies, even 
in presence of public funds, are in charge of both the management and the 
organization of the services. 
In a functional perspective where the cooperation criterion prevails, local authorities, 
including Regional Boards, take on the strategic task of coordinating the actions 
undertaken within the territory, orienting them to meet the needs of the consumers. 
When calls for tenders are issued, on the other hand, there is a tendency to a tout 
court  privatisation in which service agreements rule the obligations taken by the 
companies, almost depriving local public authorities of their supervision role.  
This consequently confirms the need to make a clear distinction between  companies 
and those bodies that are institutionally called to play the role of supervisors, for a 
better functioning of the services and in order to guarantee what follows:   
•  Giving out management contracts at prices unquestionably lower than those 
obtainable through direct commissioning; 
•  The higher the number of companies submitting a tender, the closer the 
awarding prices to average costs; 
•  In public tenders contracts are given out to companies which can count on the 
most efficient technology at the lowest costs. 
Back to the model of competition for the market, supported by the theory of the 
public services reform suggested by Demzetz in 1968, the principle is stated that it is 
not indispensable for the State to act as an entity that offers public services and 
assets. Under the same principle, once the features of the asset in question have been 
specified, market production is commissioned through a bidding mechanism.  
Another widely spread model is project financing (P.F.), a financial tool aiming to 
encourage the presence of capital for the financing of single projects, often destined 
to strengthen infrastructure. On the basis of such financial mechanism, the customers, 
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to carry out a work. The party that is assigned the contract, mostly a project 
company, is given an exclusivity guarantee which essentially translates into the right 
to manage functionally and to earn profits from the work carried out, for a length of 
time that  allows the reimbursement of the invested capital (venture capital included) 
and of the incurred debts. In particular, in the public utilities sector, the P.F. 
utilisation is motivated by the fact that this sector is characterised by levels of low 
efficiency where implementation, modernisation and development actions require 
considerable investments hard to be found on the market. 
This financial instrument effectiveness lies in the possibility of financing a project 
rather than one or more entrepreneurial subjects. It becomes obvious that the P.F. key 
element is based on the subdivision and allocation of the project risks among more 
than one subject interested in the project implementation.  
The peculiarity of these operations is to be found in the negotiation process itself, 
which revolves around the sharing of such risks, whose size is proportional to the 
total value of the project as well as to its likelihood to be successful. 
The P.F. operations are therefore rather complex, difficult, long and more expensive 
than a traditional financing process, but in many cases they represent the only 
possible way to carry out a capital intensive project. 
The subjects involved in the P.F. are: 
•  The sponsor: the subject having an interest in carrying out the project and 
therefore promoting the initiative; 
•  The project company (SPV): an ad hoc-established company. The so 
established company fulfils the sponsor’s needs to draw a clear separation between 
his own activity and the activity of the project company; 
•  The financial advisor: playing an essential role in view of the participation of 
this advisor  in the drawing up and monitoring of the economic and financial plan of 
the project; 
•  The financial arranger: generally a financial institution whose aim is to 
organise and obtain the credit facilities needed to carry out the project; 
In particular, we must nevertheless emphasise that the subjects involved in a project 
financing operation try to constitute forms of partnership where the risks are only 
limited to the amount of shares held by each party, often in the form of a consortium 
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public/private entities as a partnership or a joint venture. 
Finally, we have seen how the P.F. represents a type of financing applicable to 
specific investments and can be, as already mentioned, implemented in the water 
sector both for treatment and distribution. 
In reality, by taking as specific reference the Italian situation, the water sector in 
particular, with its poor networks and heavily inefficient infrastructure, is the area 
where project financing could play a key role as a financing channel.  
In view of the integration of the demand-management based system, a  multi-utility 
system has developed, which makes use of the new managerial culture by adopting a 
logic where infrastructure is connected to territory, in an organised set of ecological 
networks and territorial systems.  
The process of services externalisation that, as discussed so far, is at the basis of the 
SPL managerial models change, is marked by two phases:  
• 
• 
The separation of roles, the institutional role of control and 
supervision is completely separated from the organisational and 
managerial role; 
The privatisation determining the transfer of the ownership of 
the shares to private companies.  
In Italy, in particular, the offer of public utilities in terms of services tends to turn 
into a multi-utility structure since it covers at the same time the distribution and sale 
of gas, electricity and water, the removal and disposal of waste and the supply of 
non-exclusively industrial services.  
The idea of organising the distribution and sale of different services at the same time 
makes it possible to exploit the economies of scale resulting from widening of the 
productive and organisational structure. It also facilitates technological innovation 
thanks to the costs complementarity and to the same productive and industrial 
characteristics deriving from such merging.  
The multi-utility organization, according to part of the economic theory, determines 
multi-product monopolies offering the advantage to manage users jointly, while in 
terms of productive and industrial efficiency this offers new opportunities that 
facilitate the adoption of new technology. 
We must emphasise the economic weight that multi-utility companies gain since they 
reach dominant positions in the market, while it seems more appropriate to try and 
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“strengthening” operation resulting from the merging.  
The shared control of the multi-utility companies should be given to the private 
sector, in order to release local authorities for good, depriving them of their 
managerial role which, as already said, is not peculiar to public administration. 
In order to distinguish the types of advantages that multi-utility companies have, we 
can say that: 
• 
• 
Their advantages can be considered as legitimate since the 
economies of scale allow them to submit tenders with certainly more 
competitive prices; 
Their advantages can be considered less legitimate since, 
thanks to the experience acquired in previous  tenders, when 
submitting new ones they are at an advantage. 
Now, after having explored some of the most widespread public utilities management 
models, by way of illustration, we can focus our analysis on two cases of 
“decentralizing governance” on the European scale, providing some details of the 
adopted management systems for a first general identification of the various 
stakeholders involved and of the relations existing among them. 
 
2.4 The continental system and the Anglo-Saxon system: two cases of “decentralizing 
governance” 
 
Two are the cases of management of public utilities that have been taken into 
account: the French and the English models, since they mirror the structure of two 
typologies considered to be reference systems for all the operational contexts, thanks 
to the level of maturity they have gained: 
•  The “continental system” characterised by a still strongly integrated role 
between Government and public companies, with a management system essentially 
conceived as a form of control exerted by the government bureaucracy; 
•  The “Anglo-Saxon system” in which the Government is “separated” from the 
industry, while the management role is assigned to one or more independent bodies. 
The continental system has been adopted in France in the water supply sector. To this 
purpose, we see that there is no Water Ministry in France and there are no regulators 
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responsibilities in terms of  water management (agriculture water management, 
drinking water management, etc.). The coordination among all Ministries occurs 
through the Water Inter-ministerial Mission (MIE) whose task is to keep the 
Government informed on all projects related to water resources management. It is 
formed by the representatives of all Ministries competent in the water resources 
management field. 
In this management model, the Prime Minister asks the Ministry of the Environment 
to coordinate the various public subjects operating in the water sector. The same 
Ministry establishes within itself the Water Management Office, whose task is to 
guarantee the application of the Water Law issued in 1992, and to enforce the rulings 
of the Water National Committee (Guffanti & Merelli, 1997). 
This Committee is composed of private subjects (consumers associations, users’ 
representatives, sector operators), public subjects (local authorities, basin committees 
and public administration representatives) and a consulting body. 
At an administrative level, it is important to recall that in France the territory is 
divided into six hydrographical basins, and in their domains  there are two 
organisations: the Basin Committee and the Water Agency.  
The first, so-called “water parliament”, is essentially the Water Agency’s consulting 
body, composed of sector experts, consumers, etc.. Besides, it appoints the eight 
consumers’ representatives who seat in the Water Agency Board of Directors. 
In each one of the six hydrographical basins, they have created a Water Agency 
acting as an administrative public institution, with its own statutes and its own 
financial autonomy. Each Agency is managed by a Board of Directors composed of 
eight representatives from local communities, eight consumers’ categories 
representatives, eight State’s representatives and one Agency staff representative. 
The Board of Directors Head and the Agency Director are appointed by the 
Government. The Agencies coordinate the allocation of funds in order to meet the 
objectives set by the Basin Committee and to carry out studies on the state of water 
resources. 
Now, all these data indicate a still meaningful Government’s presence in the sector 
operational dynamics.  
In the second model considered, the Anglo-Saxon system, adopted in Britain, due to 
the past privatisation of public Water Authorities, the system of that regulates public 
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(OFWAT), that represent Authorities independent of the Government. 
These “offices” structure, alike the OFWAT, envisages the involvement of many 
stakeholders which are chosen among all the operators involved in the management 
of the service in question. 
In the OFWAT case, we can observe that it includes in its staff the Directors of the 
10 Water Voice Committees (e.g. CSC = Customer Service Committees), which are 
the bodies (independent of water companies) representing consumers’ interests. Their 
composition is very interesting from a governance viewpoint, since it is constituted in 
percentages of users’ representatives, academic community representatives, water 
sector experts, subjects belonging to commercial and industrial institutions.  
We have to consider as well that the OFWAT costs are completely covered by water 
companies through an annual tax calculated on the basis of the turnover obtained 
only from the regulated activities (drinkable and waste waters). 
The OFWAT General Manager (GM) regularly consults the Water Voice 
Committees in relation to each political decision to be made which could have a 
direct fallout on the users. To this purpose, the same OFWAT Charter contemplates a 
substantial exchange of periodic information between the GM and the Commissions 
(Passerelli, 1996). 
Unlike the French model, we can observe the existence of a higher degree of joint 
participation among stakeholders, which shows Britain has reached a more advanced 
stage in the implementation of a good governance. To this purpose we must, 
however,  emphasise that the circumstances are different in the two countries and that 
this model is not likely to apply successfully to the realities where the developmental 
and educational course  of the Government bodies has not been and could not be the 
same in the future. 
 
Conclusions 
From what said so far, it obviously appears that in order to reach the priority aim to 
which any kind of management has to aim, namely collective well-being, there are no 
standard formulas, nor are there predictable solutions to pursue. In the public utilities 
case we rather perceive the need to activate real cooperation mechanisms through the 
implementation of a “good” governance based on the actual territory needs. In the 
economic development and growth processes, in fact, it seems that a fundamental 
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consolidation of confidence and common value sharing among companies, economic 
stakeholders, institutional stakeholders and the local communities. 
It seems clear that the establishment of managerial models centred upon competition, 
more than once mentioned as a consequence of new processes involving public 
utilities, calls for industrial policies focused on governance substantially meaning, in 
this case, a “joint participation mechanism” aiming to the definition of the roles and 
prerogatives of the different subjects involved in the service management, i.e. the 
subjects of local authorities, company administrative and management bodies, and all 
the other stakeholders (such as consumers’ associations, lobbying groups, unions, 
suppliers, citizens-service customers, etc.). It also calls for the setting up of 
instruments and mechanisms in order to support the integration between local 
authorities and associated companies. 
In this case the objectives set are pursued mainly through infrastructure and market 
synergisms to satisfy the need to develop managerial network systems according to 
the relational systems theory, partially borrowed from organizational economics 
(Caruso & Pace, 2003). The network logic appears particularly suited to the 
management of high quality public services where the fundamental elements are the 
external relations with all subjects participating in the processes of co-production of 
local public services, besides a heritage of quality internal knowledge and innovative 
skills in the production of services. 
 
NOTES 
1 By evidence, decentralization relates to the role of, and the relationship between, central and sub-
national institutions, whether they are public, private or civic. 
2 The word regulating is used with reference to the economic regulation of the public utility services 
market, with particular reference to the water sector in which the economic regulation is made more 
complex by the presence of a natural monopoly. 
3 The necessity of proceeding to a reform of the local public services sector was no longer postponable 
since the same local governance processes couldn’t do without efficient services anymore on the 
territory. The risk of institutional confusion fuelled the overlapping and mixing up of incompatible 
objectives, such as profits increase, costs containment and consumers’ protection. The agency in 
charge of the service was unable to keep management control and did not have the tools required to to 
guarantee the economic operation of services.  
4There are a number of EU directives related to market liberalisation to which we can add the “Legge 
Bassanini” focusing on administrative federalism, i. e. the reforms which have redefined the 
  17characteristics of local and regional finances, and finally the amendments to  Title V article of the 
Constitution.  
5 The Italian Houses of Parliament have recently approved a Decree Law that envisages that ct 
companies having direct commission can also submit a tender. We must recall that, in order to 
increase the size of companies and  guarantee an efficient productive scale, it was possible to resort to 
direct commission extension, exerting the right for a transitory regime. On the basis of this transitory 
regime, the contract started the users’ number was sufficiently high and when private capital reached  
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